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Abstract
We initiate the study of multi-source extractors in the quantum world. In this setting, our goal is
to extract random bits from two independent weak random sources, on which two quantum adversaries
store a bounded amount of information. Our main result is a two-source extractor secure against quantum
adversaries, with parameters closely matching the classical case and tight in several instances. More-
over, the extractor is secure even if the adversaries share entanglement. The construction is the Chor-
Goldreich [CG88] two-source inner product extractor and its multi-bit variant by Dodis et al. [DEOR04].
Previously, research in this area focused on the construction of seeded extractors secure against quantum
adversaries; the multi-source setting poses new challenges, among which is the presence of entanglement
that could potentially break the independence of the sources.
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1 Introduction and Results
Randomness extractors are fundamental in many areas of computer science, with numerous applications to
derandomization, error-correcting codes, expanders, combinatorics and cryptography, to name just a few.
Randomness extractors generate almost uniform randomness from imperfect sources, as they appear either
in nature, or in various applications. Typically, the imperfect source is modelled as a distribution over n-bit
strings whose min-entropy is at least k, i.e., a distribution in which no string occurs with probability greater
than 2−k [SV84, CG88, Zuc90]. Such sources are known as weak sources. One way to arrive at a weak
source is to imagine that an adversary (or some process in nature), when in contact with a uniform source,
stores n− k bits of information about the string (which are later used to break the security of the extractor,
i.e. to distinguish its output from uniform). Then, from the adversary’s point of view, the source essentially
has min-entropy k.
Ideally, we would like to extract randomness from a weak source. However, it is easy to see that no
deterministic function can extract even one bit of randomness from all such sources, even for min-entropies
as high as n − 1 (see e.g. [SV84]). One main approach to circumvent this problem is to use a short truly
random seed for extraction from the weak source (seeded extractors) (see, e.g., [Sha02]). The other main
approach, which is the focus of the current work, is to use several independent weak sources (seedless
extractors) (e.g. [CG88, Vaz87, DEOR04, Bou05, Raz05] and many more).
With the advent of quantum computation, we must now deal with the possibility of quantum adversaries
(or quantum physical processes) interfering with the sources used for randomness extraction. For instance,
one could imagine that a quantum adversary now stores n− k qubits of information about the string sampled
from the source. This scenario of a bounded storage quantum adversary arises in several applications, in
particular in cryptography.
Some constructions of seeded extractors were shown to be secure in the presence of quantum adver-
saries: Ko¨nig, Maurer, and Renner [RK05, KMR05, Ren05] proved that the pairwise independent extractor
of [ILL89] is also good against quantum adversaries, and with the same parameters. Ko¨nig and Terhal
[KT08] showed that any one-bit output extractor is also good against quantum adversaries, with roughly
the same parameters. In light of this, it was tempting to conjecture that any extractor is also secure against
quantum storage. Somewhat surprisingly, Gavinsky et al. [GKK+08] gave an example of a seeded extrac-
tor that is secure against classical storage but becomes insecure even against very small quantum storage.
This example has initiated a series of recent ground-breaking work that examined which seeded extractors
stay secure against bounded storage quantum adversaries. Ta-Shma [Ta-09] gave an extractor with a short
(polylogarithmic) seed extracting a polynomial fraction of the min-entropy. His result was improved by De
and Vidick [DV10] extracting almost all of the min-entropy. Both constructions are based on Trevisan’s
extractor [Tre01].
However, the question of whether seedless multi-source extractors can remain secure against quantum
adversaries has remained wide open. The multi-source scenario corresponds to several independent adver-
saries, each tampering with one of the sources, and then jointly trying to distinguish the extractor’s output
from uniform. In the classical setting this leads to several independent weak sources. In the quantum world,
measuring the adversaries’ stored information might break the independence of the sources, thus jeopardiz-
ing the performance of the extractor.1 Moreover, the multi-source setting offers a completely new aspect of
the problem: the adversaries could potentially share entanglement prior to tampering with the sources. En-
tanglement between several parties has been known to yield several astonishing effects with no counterpart
in the classical world, e.g., non-local correlations [Bel64] and superdense coding [BW92].
We note that the example of Gavinsky et al. can also be viewed as an example in the two-source model;
we can imagine that the seed comes from a second source (of full entropy in this case, just like any seeded
1Such an effect appears also in strong seeded extractors and has been discussed in more detail in [KT08].
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extractor can be artificially viewed as a two-source extractor). And obviously, in the same way, recent work
on quantum secure seeded extractors artificially gives secure two-source extractors, albeit for a limited range
of parameters and without allowing for entanglement. However, no one has as of yet explored how more
realistic multi-source extractors fare against quantum adversaries, and in particular how entanglement might
change the picture. We ask: Are there any good multi-source extractors secure against quantum bounded
storage? And does this remain true when considering entanglement?
Our results: In this paper we answer all these questions in the positive. We focus on the inner-product
based two-source extractor of Dodis et al. [DEOR04] (DEOR-extractor). Given two independent weak
sources X and Y with the same length n and min-entropies k1 and k2 satisfying k1 + k2 ' n, this extractor
gives m close to uniform random bits, where m ≈ max(k1, k2) + k1 + k2 − n. In recent years several two-
source extractors with better parameters have been presented; however, the DEOR-construction stands out
through its elegance and simplicity and its parameters still fare very well in comparison with recent work
(e.g., [Bou05, Raz05]).
A first conceptual step in this paper is to define the model of quantum adversaries and of security in
the two-source scenario (see Defs. 5 and 6): Each adversary gets access to an independent weak source
X (resp. Y), and is allowed to store a short arbitrary quantum state.2 In the entangled setting, the two
adversaries may share arbitrary prior entanglement, and hence their final joint stored state is the possibly
entangled state ρXY. In the non-entangled case their joint state is of the form ρXY = ρX ⊗ ρY. In both cases,
the security of the extractor is defined with respect to the joint state they store.
Definition 1. [Two-source extractor against (entangled) quantum storage (informal):] A function E :
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is a (k1, k2, ε) extractor against (b1, b2) (entangled) quantum storage if for
any sources X, Y with min-entropies k1, k2, and any joint stored quantum state ρXY prepared as above, with
X-register of b1 qubits and Y-register of b2 qubits, the distribution E(X, Y) is ε-close to uniform even when
given access to ρXY.
Depending on the type of adversaries, we will say E is secure against entangled or non-entangled stor-
age. Note again that entanglement between the adversaries is specific to the multi-source scenario and does
not arise in the case of seeded extractors.
Having set the framework, we show that the construction of Dodis et al. [DEOR04] is secure, first in the
case of non-entangled adversaries.
Theorem 2. The DEOR-construction is a (k1, k2, ε) extractor against (b1, b2) non-entangled storage with
m = (1− o(1))max(k1 − b12 , k2 − b22 ) + 12(k1 − b1 + k2 − b2 − n)− 9 log ε−1 −O(1) output bits, pro-
vided k1 + k2 −max(b1, b2) > n + Ω(log3(n/ε)).
As we show next the extractor remains secure even in the case of entangled adversaries. Notice the loss
of essentially a factor of 2 in the allowed storage; this is related to the fact that superdense coding allows to
store n bits using only n/2 entangled qubit pairs.
Theorem 3. The DEOR-construction is a (k1, k2, ε) extractor against (b1, b2) entangled storage with m =
(1− o(1))max(k1 − b2, k2 − b1) + 12(k1 − 2b1 + k2 − 2b2 − n)− 9 log ε−1 −O(1) output bits, provided
k1 + k2 − 2 max(b1, b2) > n + Ω(log3(n/ε)).
Note that in both cases, when the storage is linear in the source entropy we can output Ω(n) bits with
exponentially small error. To compare to the performance of the DEOR-extractor in the classical case,
note that a source with min-entropy k and classical storage of size b roughly corresponds to a source of
min-entropy k − b (see, e.g., [Ta-09] Lem. 3.1). Using this correspondence, the extractor of [DEOR04]
2In the setting of seeded extractors with one source, this type of adversary was called quantum encoding in [Ta-09].
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gives m = max(k1, k2) + k1 − b1 + k2 − b2 − n− 6 log ε−1 −O(1) output bits against classical storage,
whenever k1 + k2 −max(b1, b2) > n + Ω(log n · (log2 n + log ε−1)). Hence the conditions under which
we can extract randomness are essentially the same for DEOR and for our Thm. 2. The amount of random
bits we can extract is somewhat less than in the classical case, even when disregarding storage.
In the non-entangled case, we are able to generalize our result to the stronger notion of guessing entropy
adversaries or so called quantum knowledge (see discussion below and Sec. 5 for details). We show that the
DEOR-extractor remains secure even in this case, albeit with slightly weaker parameters.
Theorem 4. The DEOR-construction is a (k1, k2, ε) extractor against quantum knowledge with m = (1−
o(1))max(k1, k2)+
1
6(k1 + k2− n)− 9 log ε−1−O(1) output bits, provided k1 + k2 > n+Ω(log3(n/ε)).
Strong extractors: The extractor in Thms. 2, 3 and 4 is a so called weak extractor, meaning that when
trying to break the extractor, no full access to any of the sources is given (which is natural in the multi-
source setting). We also obtain several results in the so called strong case (see Cor. 15, Lem. 19, Cor. 29
and Lem. 30). A strong extractor has the additional property that the output remains secure even if the
adversaries later gain full access to any one (but obviously not both) of the sources.3 See Sec. 2 for details
and a discussion of the subtleties in defining a strong extractor in the entangled case, and Secs. 3, 4 and 5
for our results in the strong case.
Tightness: In the one-bit output case, we show that our results are tight, both in the entangled and
non-entangled setting (see Lem. 17).
Proof ideas and tools: To show both of our results, we first focus on the simplest case of one-bit outputs.
In this case the DEOR extractor [DEOR04] simply computes the inner product E(x, y) = x · y (mod 2)
of the n-bit strings x and y coming from the two sources. Assume that the two adversaries are allowed
quantum storage of b qubits each. Given their stored information they jointly wish to distinguish E(x, y)
from uniform, or, in other words, to predict x · y. We start by observing that this setting corresponds to the
well known simultaneous message passing (SMP) model in communication complexity,4 where two parties,
Alice and Bob, have access to an input each (which is unknown to the other). They each send a message
of length b to a referee, who, upon reception of both messages, is to compute a function E(x, y) of the
two inputs. When E is hard to compute, it is a good extractor. Moreover, the entangled adversaries case
corresponds to the case of SMP with entanglement between Alice and Bob, a model that has been studied
in recent work (see e.g. [GKRdW09, GKdW06]).
Before we proceed, let us remark, that there are cases, where entanglement is known to add tremendous
power to the SMP model. Namely, Gavinsky et al. [GKRdW09] showed an exponential saving in communi-
cation in the entangled SMP model, compared to the non-entangled case.5 This points to the possibility that
some extractors can be secure against a large amount of storage in the non-entangled case, but be insecure
against drastically smaller amounts of entangled storage. Our results show that this is not the case for the
DEOR extractor, i.e., that this construction is secure against the potentially harmful effects of entanglement.
In the one-bit output DEOR case we can tap into known results on the quantum communication com-
plexity of the inner product problem (IP). Cleve et al. [CvDNT98] and Nayak and Salzman [NS06] have
given tight lower bounds in the one-way and two-way communication model, with and without entangle-
ment (which also gives bounds in the SMP model). For instance, in the non-entangled case, to compute
IP exactly in the one-way model, n qubits of communication are needed, and in the SMP model, n qubits
of communication are needed from Alice and from Bob, just like in the classical case. Note that whereas
3In [DEOR04], this is called a strong blender.
4The connection between extractors and communication complexity has been long known, see, e.g., [Vaz87].
5This result has been shown for a relation, not a function. It is tempting to conjecture that this result can be turned into an
exponential separation for an extractor with entangled vs. non-entangled adversaries. It is, however, not immediate how to turn a
worst case relation lower bound into an average case function bound, as needed in the extractor setting, so we leave this problem
open.
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in the communication setting typically worst case problems are studied, extractors correspond to average
case (w.r.t. to weak randomness) problems. With some extra work we can adapt the communication lower
bounds to weak sources and to the average bias which is needed for the extractor result. In fact, the results
we obtain hold in the strong case (where later one of the sources is completely exposed), which corresponds
to one-way communication complexity.
Tightness of our results comes from matching upper bounds on the one-way and SMP model commu-
nication complexity of the inner product. Adapting the work of [CG88] we can obtain tight bounds for any
bias ε. Somewhat surprisingly, it seems no one has looked at tight upper bounds for IP in the entangled
SMP model, where [CvDNT98] give an n/2 lower bound for the message length for Alice and Bob. It turns
out this bound is tight,6 which essentially leads to the factor 2 separation in our results for the entangled vs.
non-entangled case (see Sec. 3).
To show our results for the case of multi-bit extractors, we use the nice properties of the DEOR con-
struction (and its precursors [Vaz87, DO03]). The extractor outputs bits of the form Ax · y. Vazirani’s
XOR-Lemma allows to reduce the multi-bit to the one-bit case by relating the distance from uniform of the
multi-bit extractor to the sum of biases of XOR’s of subsets of its bits. Each such XOR, in turn, is just a
(linearly transformed) inner product, for which we already know how to bound the bias. Our main techni-
cal challenge is to adapt the XOR lemma to the case of quantum side-information (see Sec. 2). This way
we obtain first results for multi-bit extractors, which even hold in the case of strong extractors. Following
[DEOR04], we further improve the parameters in the weak extractor setting by combining our strong two-
source extractor with a good seeded extractor (in our case with the construction of [DPVR09]) to extract
even more bits. See Sec. 4 for details.
Guessing entropy: One can weaken the requirement of bounded storage, and instead only place a lower
bound on the guessing entropy of the source given the adversary’s storage, leading to the more general
definition of extractors secure against guessing entropy. Informally, a guessing entropy of at least k means
that the adversary’s probability of correctly guessing the source is at most 2−k (or equivalently, that given
the adversary’s state, the source has essentially min-entropy at least k). Working with guessing entropy has
the advantage that we no longer have to worry about two parameters (min-entropy and storage) instead only
working with one parameter (guessing entropy), and that the resulting extractors are stronger (assuming
all other parameters are the same), see Sec. 5. In the classical world, a guessing entropy of k is more or
less equivalent to a source with k min-entropy; in the quantum world, however, things become less trivial.
In the case of seeded extractors, this more general model has been successfully introduced and studied
in [Ren05, KT08, FS08, DPVR09, TSSR10], where several constructions secure against bounded guessing
entropy were shown.7
In the case of non-entangled two-source extractors, we can show (based on [KT08]) that any classical
one-bit output two-source extractor remains secure against bounded guessing entropy adversaries, albeit
with slightly worse parameters. Moreover, our XOR-Lemma allow us prove security of the DEOR-extractor
against guessing entropy adversaries even in the multi-bit case (Thm. 4, see Sec. 5 for the details).8
In the entangled adversaries case, one natural way to define the model is to require the guessing entropy
of each source given the corresponding adversary’s storage to be high. This definition, however, is too
strong: it is easy to see that no extractor can be secure against such adversaries. This follows from the
observation that by sharing a random string r1r2 (which is a special case of shared entanglement) and having
the first adversary store r1 ⊕ x, r2 and the other store r1, r2 ⊕ y, we keep the guessing entropy of X (resp.
Y) relative to the adversary’s storage unchanged yet we can recover x and y completely from the combined
storage.
6We thank Ronald de Wolf [dW10] for generously allowing us to adapt his upper bound to our setting.
7Renner [Ren05] deals with the notion of relative min-entropy, which was shown to be equivalent to guessing entropy [KRS09].
8We are grateful to Thomas Vidick for pointing out that our XOR-Lemma allows us to obtain results also in this setting.
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Hence we are naturally lead to consider the weaker requirement that the guessing entropy of each source
given the combined storage of both adversaries is high. We now observe that already the DEOR one-bit
extractor (where the output is simply the inner product) is not secure under this definition, indicating that
this definition is still too strong. To see this, consider uniform n-bit sources X, Y, and say Alice stores
x⊕ r, and Bob stores y⊕ r, where r is a shared random string. Obviously, their joint state does not help in
guessing X (or Y), hence the guessing entropy of the sources is still n; but their joint state does give x⊕ y.
If, in addition, Alice also stores the Hamming weight |x| mod 4 and Bob |y| mod 4, the guessing entropy
is barely affected, and indeed one can easily show it is n−O(1). However, their information now suffices
to compute x · y exactly, since x · y = 12((|x|+ |y| − |x ⊕ y|) mod 4). Hence inner product is insecure in
this model even for very high guessing entropies, even though it is secure against a fair amount of bounded
storage.
In light of this, it is not clear if and how entangled guessing entropy sources can be incorporated into the
model, and hence we only consider bounded storage adversaries in the entangled case.
Related work: We are the first to consider two-source extractors in the quantum world, especially against
entanglement. As mentioned, previous work on seeded extractors against quantum adversaries [RK05,
KMR05, Ren05, KT08, Ta-09, DV10, DPVR09, BT10] gives rise to trivial two-source extractors where one
of the sources is not touched by the adversaries. However, the only previous work that allows to derive
results in the genuine two-source scenario is the work by Ko¨nig and Terhal [KT08]. Using what is implicit
in their work, and with some extra effort, it is possible to obtain results in the one-bit output non-entangled
two-source scenario (which hold against guessing entropy adversaries, but with worse performance than our
results for the inner product extractor), and we give this result in detail in Sec. 5. Moreover, [KT08] show
that any classical multi-bit extractor is secure against bounded storage adversaries, albeit with an exponential
decay in the error parameter. This easily extends to the non-entangled two-source scenario, to give results in
the spirit of Thm. 2. We have worked out the details and comparison to Thm. 2 in App. A. Note, however,
that to our knowledge no previous work gives results in the entangled scenario.
Discussion and Open Problems: We have, for the first time, studied two-source extractors in the quantum
world. Previously, only seeded extractors have been studied in the quantum setting. In the two-source
scenario a new phenomenon appears: entanglement between the (otherwise independent) sources. We have
formalized what we believe the strongest possible notion of quantum adversaries in this setting and shown
that one of the best performing extractors, the DEOR-construction, remains secure. We also show that our
results are tight in the one-bit output case.
Our results for the multi-bit output DEOR-construction allow to extract slightly less bits compared
to what is possible classically. An interesting open quesiotn is whether it is possible to obtain matching
parameters in the (non-entangled) quantum case. One might have to refine the analysis and not rely solely
on communication complexity lower bounds. Alternatively, our quantum XOR-Lemma currently incurs a
penalty exponential in either the length of the output or the length of the storage. Any improvement here
also immediately improves all three main theorems. In particular, by removing the penalty entirely, Thm. 2
can be made essentially optimal (with respect to the classical case).
We have shown that inner product based constructions are necessarily insecure in two reasonable models
of entangled guessing entropy adversaries (and hence that bounded storage adversaries are the more appro-
priate model in the entangled case). It should be noted that it is possible that other extractor constructions
(not based on inner product) could remain secure in this setting, and this subject warrants further exploration.
As pointed out, it is conceivable that entanglement could break the security of two-source extractors. Ev-
idence for this is provided by the communication complexity separation in the entangled vs. non-entangled
SMP-model, given in [GKRdW09]. A fascinating open problem is to turn this relational separation into an
extractor that is secure against non-entangled quantum adversaries but completely broken when entangle-
ment is present.
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Our work leaves several other open questions. It would be interesting to see if other multi-source ex-
tractors remain secure against entangled adversaries, in particular the recent breakthrough construction by
Bourgain [Bou05] which works for two sources with min-entropy (1/2− α)n each for some small constant
α, or the construction of Raz [Raz05], where one source is allowed to have logarithmic min-entropy while
the other has min-entropy slightly larger than n/2. Both extractors are based on the inner product and output
Ω(n) almost uniform bits.
And lastly, it would be interesting to see other application of secure multi-source extractors in the quan-
tum world. One possible scenario is multi-party computation. Classically, Kalai et al. [KLR09] show that
sufficiently strong two-source extractors allow to perform multi-party communication with weak sources
when at least two parties are honest. Perhaps similar results hold in the quantum setting.
Structure of the paper: In Sec. 2 we introduce our basic notation and definitions, and describe the DEOR
construction. Here we also present one of our tools, the ”quantum” XOR-Lemma. Sec. 3 is dedicated to
the one-bit output case and the connection to communication complexity and gives our tightness results. In
Sec. 4 we deal with the multi-bit output case and prove our main result, Thms. 2 and 3. In Sec. 5 we present
our results against non-entangled guessing entropy adversaries (partly based on [KT08]) and prove Thm. 4.
App. A works out the results that can be derived from [KT08] in the case of multi-bit extractors against
non-entangled bounded storage.
2 Preliminaries and Tools
In this section we provide the necessary notation, formalize Def.1, describe the DEOR-extractor and present
and prove our quantum XOR-Lemma. For background on quantum information see e.g. [NC00].
Notation: Given a classical random variable Z and a set of density matrices {ρz}z∈Z we denote by ZρZ the
cq-state ∑z∈Z Pr[Z = z]|z〉〈z| ⊗ ρz. When the distribution is clear from the context we write p(z) instead of
Pr[Z = z]. For any random variable Z′ on the domain of Z, we define ρZ′ := ∑z∈Z′ Pr[Z′ = z]ρz. For any
random variable Y, let YρZ := ∑y∈Y Pr[Y = y]|y〉〈y| ⊗ ρZ|Y=y. We denote by Um the uniform distribution
on m bits. For matrix norms, we define |A|tr = 12 ‖A‖1 = 12 Tr(
√
A†A) and ‖A‖2 =
√
Tr(A† A).
Extractors against quantum storage: We first formalize the different types of quantum storage.
Definition 5. For two random variables X, Y we say ρXY is a (b1, b2) entangled storage if it is generated
by two non communicating parties, Alice and Bob, in the following way. Alice and Bob share an arbitrary
entangled state. Alice receives x ∈ X, Bob receives y ∈ Y. They each apply any quantum operation on
their qubits. Alice then stores b1 of her qubits (and discards the rest), and Bob stores b2 of his qubits, giving
the state ρxy.
We denote by ρAXY the state obtained when Alice stores her entire state, whereas Bob stores only b2
qubits of his, and similarly for ρBXY.
We say ρXY is (b1, b2) non-entangled storage if ρxy = ρx ⊗ ρy for all x ∈ X, y ∈ Y.
The security of the extractor is defined relative to the storage.
Definition 6. A (k1, k2, ε) 2-source extractor against (b1, b2) (entangled) quantum storage is a function
E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m such that for any independent n-bit weak sources X, Y with respective
min-entropies k1, k2, and any (b1, b2) (entangled) storage ρXY, |E(X, Y)ρXY −UmρXY|tr ≤ ε.
The extractor is called X-strong if |E(X, Y)ρXYX −UmρXYX|tr ≤ ε, and X-superstrong when ρXY is
replaced by ρAXY. It is called (super)strong if it is both X- and Y- (super)strong.
A note on the definition: A strong extractor is secure even if at the distinguishing stage one of the sources
is completely exposed. A superstrong extractor is secure even if, in addition, the matching party’s entire state
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is also given. Without entanglement, the two are equal, as the state can be completely reconstructed from
the source. In the communication complexity setting the model of strong extractors corresponds to the SMP
model where the referee also gets access to one of the inputs, whereas the model of superstrong extractors
corresponds to the one-way model, where one party also has access to its share of the entangled state.
To prove E is an extractor, it suffices to show that it is either X-strong or Y-strong. All our proofs follow
this route.
Flat sources: It is well known that any source with min-entropy k is a convex combination of flat sources
(i.e., sources that are uniformly distributed over their support) with min-entropy k. In what follows we will
therefore only consider such sources in our analysis of extractors, as one can easily verify that
|E(X, Y)ρXY −UmρXY|tr ≤ max
i,j
∣∣∣E(Xi, Yj)ρXiYj −UmρXiYj∣∣∣
tr
,
where X = ∑ αiXi and Y = ∑ β jYj are convex combinations of flat sources.
The DEOR construction: The following (strong) extractor construction is due to Dodis et al. [DEOR04].
Every output bit is a linearly transformed inner product, namely Aix · y for some full rank matrix Ai, where
x and y are the n-bit input vectors. Here x · y := ∑nj=1 xjyj (mod 2). The matrices Ai have the additional
property that every subset sum is also of full rank. This ensures that any XOR of some bits of the output is
itself a linearly transformed inner product.
Lemma 7 ([DEOR04]). For all n > 0, there exist an efficiently computable set of n× n matrices A1, A2, . . . , An
over GF(2) such that for any non-empty set S ⊆ [n], AS := ∑i∈S Ai has full rank.
Definition 8 (strong blender of [DEOR04]). Let n ≥ m > 0, and let {Ai}mi=1 be a set as above. The
DEOR-extractor ED : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is given by ED(x, y) = A1x · y, A2x · y, . . . , Amx · y.
The XOR-Lemma: Vazirani’s XOR-Lemma [Vaz87] relates the non-uniformity of a distribution to the
non-uniformity of the characters of the distribution, i.e., the XOR of certain bit positions. For the DEOR-
extractor it allows to reduce the multi-bit output case to the binary output case.
Lemma 9 (Classical XOR-Lemma [Vaz87, Gol95]). For every m-bit random variable Z
|Z −Um|21 ≤ ∑
0 6=S∈{0,1}m
|(S · Z)−U1|21 .
This lemma is not immediately applicable in our scenario, as we need to take into account quantum side
information. For this, we need a slightly more general XOR-Lemma.
Lemma 10 (Classical-Quantum XOR-Lemma). 9 Let ZρZ be an arbitrary cq-state, where Z is an m-bit
classical random variable and ρZ is of dimension 2d. Then
|ZρZ −UmρZ|2tr ≤ 2min(d,m) · ∑
0 6=S∈{0,1}m
|(S · Z)ρZ −U1ρZ|2tr .
Proof. Following the proof of the classical XOR-Lemma in [Gol95], we first relate ‖ZρZ −UmρZ‖1 to
‖ZρZ −UmρZ‖2, and then view ZρZ − UmρZ in the Hadamard (or Fourier) basis, giving us the desired
result. We need the following simple claim.
Claim 11. For any Boolean function f , ‖ f (Z)ρZ −U1ρZ‖1 =
∥∥∥∑z(−1) f (z)p(z)ρz∥∥∥
1
.
9We thank Thomas Vidick for pointing out that we can also have a bound in terms of m and not only d.
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Proof. Denote ρb = ∑z: f (z)=b p(z)ρz for b = 0, 1. Then ρZ = ρ0 + ρ1 and
‖ f (Z)ρZ −U1ρZ‖1 =
∥∥∥∥|0〉〈0| ⊗ ρ0 + |1〉〈1| ⊗ ρ1 − 12(|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|)⊗ (ρ0 + ρ1)
∥∥∥∥
1
=
1
2
‖|0〉〈0| ⊗ (ρ0 − ρ1) + |1〉〈1| ⊗ (ρ1 − ρ0)‖1
= ‖ρ0 − ρ1‖1 =
∥∥∥∥∥∑z (−1) f (z)p(z)ρz
∥∥∥∥∥
1
. (1)
Let χS(z) = (−1)S·z for S ∈ {0, 1}m. Denote D = 2d, M = 2m, and σz = p(z)ρz − 1M ρZ. Then
‖ZρZ −UmρZ‖21 =
∥∥∥∥∥∑z |z〉〈z| ⊗ σz
∥∥∥∥∥
2
1
=
∥∥∥∥∥(H⊗m ⊗ ID)
(
∑
z
|z〉〈z| ⊗ σz
)
(H⊗m ⊗ ID)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
1
=
1
M2
·
∥∥∥∥∥∑
z,y,S
|y〉〈S| ⊗ χS(z)χy(z)σz
∥∥∥∥∥
2
1
≤ D
M
·
∥∥∥∥∥∑
z,y,S
|y〉〈S| ⊗ χS(z)χy(z)σz
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
, (2)
where H is the Hadamard transform.
Factor D: Using the fact that the ‖·‖22 of a matrix is the sum of ‖·‖22 of its (D × D) sub-blocks, together
with χS(z)χy(z) = χy+S(z) and ‖·‖2 ≤ ‖·‖1, (2) gives
‖ZρZ −UmρZ‖21 ≤
D
M ∑y
∑
S
∥∥∥∥∥∑z χy+S(z)σz
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
= D ∑
S
∥∥∥∥∥∑z χS(z)σz
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
≤ D ∑
S
∥∥∥∥∥∑z χS(z)σz
∥∥∥∥∥
2
1
. (3)
Using Claim 11 with f (Z) = S · Z, we get
∑
S 6=0
‖(S · Z)ρZ −U1ρZ‖21 = ∑
S 6=0
∥∥∥∥∥∑z χS(z)p(z)ρz
∥∥∥∥∥
2
1
= ∑
S 6=0
∥∥∥∥∥∑z χS(z)σz
∥∥∥∥∥
2
1
= ∑
S
∥∥∥∥∥∑z χS(z)σz
∥∥∥∥∥
2
1
, (4)
where the second equality holds since χS is balanced, and the third since ∑z σz = 0. Combining Eqs. (3)
and (4) gives the desired result.
Factor M: Restarting from the next-to-last step of (2), using again χS(z)χy(z) = χy+S(z) and the triangle
inequality, we obtain
‖ZρZ −UmρZ‖21 ≤
1
M2
·
(
∑
S
∥∥∥∥∥∑y |y〉〈S + y| ⊗
(
∑
z
χS(z)σz
)∥∥∥∥∥
1
)2
≤ 1
M
·∑
S
∥∥∥∥∥∑y |y〉〈S + y| ⊗
(
∑
z
χS(z)σz
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
1
= M ·∑
S
∥∥∥∥∥∑z χS(z)σz
∥∥∥∥∥
2
1
,
where the last step follows from the observation that the matrices inside the norms are of the form P ⊗ B
where P is a permutation matrix. In this case ‖P⊗ B‖1 = dim(P) · ‖B‖1 = M · ‖B‖1. As before,
combining this with Eq. (4) gives the desired bound.
8
3 Communication Complexity and One-Bit Extractors
3.1 Average case lower bound for inner product
Cleve et al. [CvDNT98] give a lower bound for the worst case one-way quantum communication complexity
of inner product with arbitrary prior entanglement. It is achieved by first reducing the problem of computing
the inner product to that of transmitting one input over a quantum channel, and then using an extended
Holevo bound. Nayak and Salzman [NS06] obtained an optimal lower bound by replacing Holevo with a
more “mission-specific” bound:
Theorem 12 ([NS06], Thm 1.3 and discussion thereafter). Let X be an n-bit random variable with min-
entropy k, and suppose Alice wishes to convey X to Bob over a one-way quantum communication channel
using b qubits. Let Y be the random variable denoting Bob’s guess for X. Then
1. Pr[Y = X] ≤ 2−(k−b), if the parties don’t share prior entanglement, and
2. Pr[Y = X] ≤ 2−(k−2b).
Revisiting Cleve et al.’s reduction, we now show how to adapt it to flat sources, to the average case error
and to the linearly transformed inner product. The main challenge is to carefully treat the error terms so as
to not cancel out the (small) amplitude of the correct state.
Lemma 13. Let X, Y be flat sources over n bits with min-entropies k1, k2, and A, B full rank n by n matrices
over GF(2). Let P be a b qubit one-way protocol for (AX) · (BY) with success probability 12 + ε. Then
(a) ε ≤ 2−(k1+k2−2b−n+2)/2, if the parties share prior entanglement and
(b) ε ≤ 2−(k1+k2−b−n+2)/2 otherwise.
Proof. Let us first consider the case A = B = I. Assume w.l.o.g. Bob delays his operations until re-
ceiving the message from Alice and that in his first step he copies his input, leaving the original untouched
throughout. Further assume Bob outputs the result in one of his qubits.
For a fixed x, denote the success probability of P by 12 + εx (εx might be negative). Denote Bob’s state
after receiving the message as |y〉|0〉|σx〉, where σx is taken to contain Alice’s message and Bob’s prior
entangled qubits as required by the protocol (if present). The rest of the protocol is now performed locally
by Bob. We denote this computation PB. After applying PB, Bob’s state is of the form
αx,y|y〉|x · y〉|Jx,y〉+ βx,y|y〉|x · y〉|Kx,y〉,
and by assumption, Eyβ2x,y = 12 − εx. Following the analysis in [CvDNT98], using clean computation,
where the output is produced in a new qubit (the leftmost), gives the state
|z + x · y〉|y〉|0〉|σx〉+
√
2βx,y|Mx,y,z〉,
where |Mx,y,z〉 =
(
1√
2
|z + x · y〉 − 1√
2
|z + x · y〉
)
P†B|y〉|x · y〉|Kx,y〉. Observe the following properties of
M: 1. |Mx,y,0〉 = −|Mx,y,1〉 2. As y ∈ Y varies, the states |Mx,y,z〉 are orthonormal. 3. Since P†B does
not affect the first n (so called input) qubits, |Mx,y,z〉 is orthogonal to states of the form |a〉|y′〉 ⊗ |·〉 for all
a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ Y, y′ /∈ Y.
We now use the following steps to transfer X from Alice to Bob:
1. Bob prepares the state
√
2−k2−1 ·∑y∈Y,a∈{0,1}(−1)a|a〉|y〉.
2. Alice and Bob execute the clean version of P.
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3. Bob performs the Hadamard transform on each of his first n + 1 qubits and measures in the computa-
tional basis.
After the second step, Bob’s state is |ψ〉 = |v〉+~e where
|v〉 =
√
2−k2−1 ∑
y∈Y,a∈{0,1}
(−1)a+x·y|a〉|y〉|0〉|σx〉 ~e =
√
2−k2−1 ∑
y∈Y,a∈{0,1}
(−1)a
√
2βx,y|Mx,y,a〉.
By the properties of |Mx,y,z〉, ‖~e‖ = 2
√
Eyβ2x,y = 2
√
1
2 − εx. Since |v〉+~e and |v〉 are normalized states,
we can easily derive 〈v|(|v〉 +~e) = 2εx. Define
|ψ0〉 = H⊗n+1|1x〉 ⊗ |0〉|σx〉 =
√
2k2−n|v〉+
√
2−n−1 ∑
y/∈Y,a∈{0,1}
(−1)a+x·y|a〉|y〉|0〉|σx 〉,
and note that the second term is orthogonal to both |v〉 and ~e. It follows that 〈ψ|ψ0〉 =
√
2k2−n+2εx.
Applying the Hadamard transform in Step 3. does not affect the inner product, and so Bob will measure |1x〉
with probability 2k2−n+2 · ε2x. Applying Thm. 12.1 and 12.2 along with Jensen’s inequality now completes
the proof.
For the general case where A 6= I or B 6= I, we modify Step 3. of the transmission protocol. Instead
of the Hadamard transform, Bob applies the inverse of the unitary transformation |z〉|x〉 7→
√
2−n−1 ·
∑y,a(−1)za+(Ax)·(By)|a〉|y〉. It is easy to check that this gives the desired result.
3.2 One bit extractor
When the extractor’s output is binary, distinguishing it from uniform is equivalent to computing the output
on average. This was shown by Yao [Yao82] when the storage is classical and is trivially extended to the
quantum setting. With this observation, reformulating Lem. 13 in the language of trace distance yields a one
bit extractor.
Corollary 14. The function EIP(x, y) = x · y is a (k1, k2, ε) extractor against (b1, b2) (entangled) quantum
storage provided
(a) (entangled) k1 + k2 − 2 min(b1, b2) ≥ n− 2 + 2 log ε−1,
(b) (non-entangled) k1 + k2 −min(b1, b2) ≥ n− 2 + 2 log ε−1.
Proof. With Yao’s equivalence, Lem. 13.(a) immediately gives
|(AX ·Y)ρXYX −UρXYX|tr ≤ 2−(k1+k2−2b2−n+2)/2 (5)
|(AX ·Y)ρXYY −UρXYY|tr ≤ 2−(k1+k2−2b1−n+2)/2 (6)
for any full rank matrix A, and specifically for A = I. By the assumption on ε, EIP is either Y-strong or
X-strong. Repeating this argument with Lem. 13.(b) gives the non-entangled case.
Recall (see Def. 6 and discussion thereafter) that one-way communication corresponds to the model of
superstrong extractors. It is not surprising then that Lem. 13 actually implies a superstrong extractor. By
choosing ε in the above proof of Cor. 14 such that both inequalities (5) and (6) are satisfied, where we replace
ρxY by ρAxY to include Alice’s complete state as well as Bob’s entangled qubits and similarly for ρBXy, we
obtain:
Corollary 15. The function EIP(x, y) = x · y is a (k1, k2, ε) superstrong extractor against (b1, b2) (entan-
gled) quantum storage provided
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(a) (entangled) k1 + k2 − 2 max(b1, b2) ≥ n− 2 + 2 log ε−1,
(b) (non-entangled) k1 + k2 −max(b1, b2) ≥ n− 2 + 2 log ε−1.
We now show that the parameters of all our extractors are tight up to an additive constant. For simplicity,
assume first that the error ε is close to 1/2, the sources are uniform and b1 = b2 := b. Cor. 14 then states
that EIP is an extractor as long as b < n in the non-entangled case and b < n/2 in the entangled case.
Indeed, in the non-entangled case it is trivial to compute the inner product in the SMP model (i.e., break the
extractor) when b ≥ n. With entanglement, b ≥ n/2 suffices as demonstrated by the following protocol,
adapted from a protocol by de Wolf [dW10].
Claim 16. The inner product function for n bit strings is exactly computable in the SMP model with entan-
glement with n/2 + 2 qubits of communication from each party.
Proof. Let x, y ∈ {0, 1}n be Alice and Bob’s inputs. Since x · y = 12((|x| + |y| − |x ⊕ y|) mod 4), it
suffices to show that the referee can compute x ⊕ y with n/2 qubits of communication from each party, or
simply x1x2 ⊕ y1y2 with one qubit of communication each.
Denote the Pauli matrices σ00 = I, σ01 = Z, σ10 = X, σ11 = ZX. Given a shared EPR pair, Alice
applies σx1x2 to her qubit and sends it to the referee, and Bob does the same with σy1y2 . Note that applying
σb1b2 to the first qubit has the same effect as applying it to the second qubit. Further, X is applied iff b1
is 1 and Z is applied iff b2 is 1. Since two applications of X (Z) cancel each other out, we have that X is
applied to the first qubit iff x1 + y1 = 1 and Z is applied to the first qubit iff x2 + y2 = 1. The net effect on
the EPR state is σx1x2⊕y1y2 ⊗ I. For each value of x1x2 ⊕ y1y2 this gives one of the orthogonal (completely
distinguishable) Bell states.
Showing that our results are tight for arbitrary ε is trickier. We show
Lemma 17. If EIP = x · y is a (k1, k2, ε) extractor against (b1, b2) (entangled) storage then
(a) (entangled) k1 + k2 − 2 min(b1, b2) > n− 9 + 2 log ε−1,
(b) (non-entangled) k1 + k2 −min(b1, b2) > n− 5 + 2 log ε−1.
If EIP is superstrong, then
(a) (entangled) k1 + k2 − 2 max(b1, b2) > n− 9 + 2 log ε−1,
(b) (non-entangled) k1 + k2 −max(b1, b2) > n− 5 + 2 log ε−1.
Proof. We give a slightly modified version of Proposition 10 in [CG88], taking into account quantum side
information. We need the following theorem.
Theorem 18 ([CG88, Theorem 3]). There exist independent random variables X, Y on l bits with min-
entropy l − 3 each10 such that Pr[X ·Y = 0] > 12 + 2−(l−1)/2.
We start in the weak extractor setting with entanglement. We construct sources X, Y with min-entropy
k1, k2 and (b1, b2) entangled quantum storage ρXY for which the error will be ”large”. Let b = 2(min(b1, b2)−
2), and let ∆ = k1 + k2 − n. If ∆ ≤ b, we pick X to be uniform on the first k1 bits and 0 elsewhere, Y
uniform on the last k2 bits and 0 elsewhere. The inner product of X, Y is then the inner product of at most b
bits, and can be computed exactly using the SMP protocol in Claim 16 with min(b1, b2) qubits from each.
In the case ∆ > b, we define X = X1X2X3X4 as follows: X1 is uniform on b bits, X2 is uniform on
k1 − ∆ − 3 bits, X3 is the first (∆ + 6− b, ∆ + 3− b) source promised by Thm. 18 (for l = ∆ + 6− b),
and X4 is constant 0n−k1−3. Analogously, Y = Y1Y2Y3Y4 is defined as: Y1 is uniform on b bits, Y2 is
10[CG88] prove the claim with slightly different parameters for arbitrary Boolean functions. Our modification is trivial.
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constant 0n−k2−3, Y3 is the second (∆ + 6− b, ∆ + 3− b) source promised by Thm. 18, and Y4 is uniform
on k2 − ∆ − 3 bits. It is easily verified that H∞(X) ≥ k1 and H∞(Y) ≥ k2. Finally, we set ρXY to be
the entangled (min(b1, b2), min(b1, b2)) storage of the SMP protocol in Claim 16 allowing us to compute
x1 · y1 exactly, and M the measurement strategy of the referee. Applying Thm. 18,
Pr[M(ρXY) = X ·Y] = Pr[X1 ·Y1 = X · Y] = Pr[X3 ·Y3 = 0] > 1
2
+ 2−(∆+5−b)/2
and |(X · Y)ρXY −UρXY|tr > 2−(k1+k2−b−n+5)/2.
In the non-entangled case, we simply set b = min(b1, b2) and replace the SMP protocol with a trivial
protocol for IP on b bits.11
In the superstrong case with entanglement, assume w.l.o.g. that b1 > b2 and choose b = b1/2. We then
let ρxy be the entangled state that appears in the superdense coding protocol for X1. Thus, exposing Bob’s
state allows us to compute X1 ·Y1 exactly. Without entanglement, we set b = b1 and have Alice send X1 to
Bob.
4 Many Bit Extractors
Here we prove our main Theorems 2 and 3. First, using our quantum XOR-Lemma 10, we obtain results in
the strong case.
Lemma 19. ED is a (k1, k2, ε) X-strong extractor against (b1, b2) (entangled) quantum storage provided
(a) (entangled) k1 + k2 − 2b2 ≥ 2m + n− 2 + 2 log ε−1,
(b) (non-entangled) k1 + k2 − b2 ≥ 2m + n− 2 + 2 log ε−1.
Proof. Recall that ED(x, y) = A1x · y, A2x · y, . . . , Amx · y (see Def. 8). For 0 6= S ∈ {0, 1}m, let
AS = ∑i:Si=1 Ai and note that S · E(x, y) = ASx · y. By the XOR-Lemma 10,
|E(X, Y)ρXYX −UmρXYX|tr ≤
√
2m ∑
S 6=0
∣∣(ASX ·Y)ρXYX −U1ρXYX∣∣2tr.
The result then follows by Ineq. (5) in the proof of Cor. 14 and its non-entangled analogue.
In a similar way, we also obtain a Y-strong extractor with analogous parameters. Following [DEOR04],
we now apply a seeded extractor against quantum storage (see Def. 20) to the output of an X-strong (Y-
strong) extractor to obtain a two-source extractor with more output bits (see Lem. 21).
Definition 20 ([Ta-09]). A function E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a (k, ε) seeded extractor against b
quantum storage if for any n-bit source X with min-entropy k and any b qubit quantum storage ρX ,
|E(X, Ud)ρX −UmρX|tr ≤ ε.
Lemma 21. Let EB : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}d be a (k1, k2, ε) X-strong extractor against (b1, b2)
(entangled) quantum storage, and let ES : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m and E(x, y) = ES(x, EB(x, y)).
(a) (entangled) If ES is a (k1, ε) seeded extractor against b1 + b2 quantum storage then E is a (k1, k2, 2ε)
extractor against (b1, b2) entangled quantum storage.
11In fact, this shows that our non-entangled extractor is tight even for classical storage.
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(b) (non-entangled) If ES is a (k1, ε) seeded extractor against b1 quantum storage then E is a (k1, k2, 2ε)
extractor against (b1, b2) non-entangled quantum storage.
Proof. Part (a): |EB(X, Y)ρXYX −UdρXYX|tr ≤ ε and so |ES(X, EB(X, Y))ρXY − ES(X, Ud)ρXY|tr ≤
ε. But |ES(X, Ud)ρXY −UmρXY|tr ≤ ε by definition of ES. The result follows from the triangle in-
equality. For part (b) note that when the storage is non-entangled, |ES(X, Ud)ρXρY −UmρXρY|tr =
|ES(X, Ud)ρX −UmρX |tr, and it suffices to require that ES be a seeded extractor against only b1 quantum
storage.
A seeded extractor with almost optimal min-entropy loss is given in [DPVR09]. Their extractor is secure
against guessing entropy sources, and so trivially against quantum storage [KT08] (see Sec. 5 for details).
We reformulate the seeded extractor in terms of Def. 20.
Corollary 22 ([DPVR09, Corrolary 5.3]). There exists an explicit (k, ε) seeded extractor against b quantum
storage with seed length d = O(log3(n/ε)) and m = d + k− b− 8 log(k− b)− 8 log ε−1 −O(1) output
bits.
The proofs of Thms. 3 and 2 now follow by composing the explicit extractors of Lem. 19 and Cor. 22 as
in Lem. 21.
Proof of Theorem 3: ED is an X-strong extractor against entangled storage with 12(k1 + k2 − 2b2 −
n − 2 log ε−1) almost uniform output bits. This is larger than O(log3(n/ε)) when k1 + k2 − 2b2 > n +
Ω(log3(n/ε)), allowing us to compose it with the seeded extractor secure against b1 + b2 storage of Cor. 22
on the source X, obtaining m = 12 (k1 + k2− 2b2− n− 2 log ε−1)+ (k1− b1− b2)− 8 log(k1− b1− b2)−
8 log ε−1 −O(1). Similarly, ED is a Y-strong extractor, and can be composed with the seeded extractor on
the source Y. Choosing the better of the two, we prove the desired result.12
Proof of Theorem 2: ED is an X-strong extractor against non-entangled storage with 12 (k1 + k2 − b2 −
n − 2 log ε−1) almost uniform output bits. This is larger than O(log3(n/ε)) when k1 + k2 − b2 > n +
Ω(log3(n/ε)). Composing with the seeded extractor secure against b1 storage of Cor. 22 on the source
X gives m = 12(k1 + k2 − b2 − n − 2 log ε−1) + (k1 − b1) − 8 log(k1 − b1) − 8 log ε−1 − O(1), and
similarly for Y.
5 Guessing Entropy Adversaries
In previous sections, we considered extractors in the presence of quantum adversaries with limited storage.
A stronger notion of quantum adversary was also studied in the literature [Ren05, KT08, FS08, DPVR09,
TSSR10].
Definition 23 ([KT08]). Let XρX be an arbitrary cq-state. The guessing entropy of X given ρX is
Hg(X ← ρX) := − log max
M
Ex←X[Tr(Mxρx)],
where the maximum ranges over all POVMs M = {Mx}x∈X.
Considering the probability distribution on the support of X induced by measuring with M on ρX
(which we denote by M(ρX)), the above can be perhaps more easily understood as Hg(X ← ρX) =
− log maxM Pr[M(ρX) = X]. Renner [Ren05] considered sources with high relative min-entropy, rather
than guessing entropy. The two were shown to be equivalent [KRS09].
12We slightly sacrifice the parameters in the formulation of the theorem to simplify the result.
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We can now define two-source extractors secure against non-entangled guessing entropy adversaries.
Recall that in the non-entangled case the bounded storage is given by ρX ⊗ ρY (see Def. 5). Here, we place
a limit not on the amount of storage, but on the amount of information, in terms of guessing entropy, the
adversaries have on their respective sources. That is, we require that the guessing entropy of X (Y) given ρX
(ρY) be high. We refer to the state ρX ⊗ ρY as quantum knowledge, or if ρx, ρy are classical for every x, y,
as classical knowledge.
Definition 24. A (k1, k2, ε) two-source extractor against quantum knowledge is a function E : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}m such that for any independent sources X, Y and quantum knowledge ρX ⊗ ρY with
guessing entropies Hg(X ← ρX) ≥ k1, Hg(Y ← ρY) ≥ k2, we have |E(X, Y)ρXρY −UmρXρY|tr ≤ ε.
The extractor is called X-strong if |E(X, Y)ρYX −UmρYX|tr ≤ ε. It is called strong if it is both
X-strong and Y-strong.
It was shown that Hg(X ← ρX) ≥ H∞(X) − log dim(ρX) [KT08]. Thus, we can view adversaries
with bounded quantum storage as a special case of general adversaries. In particular, a (k1 − b1, k2 −
b2, ε) extractor against quantum knowledge is trivially a (k1, k2, ε) extractor against non-entangled (b1, b2)
storage.
One-bit output case: Ko¨nig and Terhal [KT08] show that every classical one-bit output strong seeded
extractor is also a strong extractor against quantum knowledge with roughly the same parameters. They
reduce the ”quantum security” of the extractor to the ”classical security”, irrespective of the entropy of the
seed. Informally, |E(X, Y)ρXY −U1ρXY|tr is small if the statement is also true when ρX is classical. We
give a version of their Lem. 2 with slightly improved parameters. The lemma shows that it suffices to prove
security of an extractor with respect only to classical knowledge obtained by performing a Pretty Good
Measurement (PGM) [HW94] on arbitrary quantum knowledge. For a cq-state ZρZ, a PGM is a POVM
E = {Ez}z∈Z such that Ez = p(z)ρ−1/2Z ρzρ−1/2Z .
Lemma 25. Let ZρZ be a cq-state, and f be a Boolean function. Then13
| f (Z)ρZ −UρZ|tr ≤
√
1
2
| f (Z)E(ρZ)−UE(ρZ)|tr,
where E = {Ez}z∈Z is a Pretty Good Measurement, Ez = p(z)ρ−1/2Z ρzρ−1/2Z .
Proof. We need the following lemma.
Lemma 26 ([Ren05, Lemma 5.1.3]). Let S be a Hermitian operator and let σ be a nonnegative operator.
Then |S|tr ≤ 12
√
Tr(σ)Tr(σ−1/2Sσ−1/2S).
Denote ρ = ρZ, ρb = ∑z: f (z)=b p(z)ρz for b = 0, 1. Further define (informally) a POVM M for
guessing f from ρZ by first applying E to get z and then computing f (z). Then
Pr[M(ρZ) = f (Z)] = ∑
z
p(z) ∑
z′ : f (z′)= f (z)
Tr(Ez′ρz)
= Tr( ∑
f (z′)= f (z)
ρ−1/2(p(z′)ρz′)ρ−1/2(p(z)ρz))
= Tr(ρ−1/2ρ0ρ−1/2ρ0 + ρ−1/2ρ1ρ−1/2ρ1),
13E(ρZ) is a classical probability distribution and the trace distance | f (Z)E(ρZ)−UE(ρZ)|tr reduces to the classical variational
distance.
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and similarly Pr[M(ρZ) 6= f (Z)] = Tr(ρ−1/2ρ0ρ−1/2ρ1 + ρ−1/2ρ1ρ−1/2ρ0). Hence
|Pr[M(ρZ) = f (Z)]− Pr[M(ρZ) 6= f (Z)]| = Tr(ρ−1/2(ρ0 − ρ1)ρ−1/2(ρ0 − ρ1)). (7)
By Eq. (1), | f (Z)ρZ −UρZ|tr = |ρ0 − ρ1|tr, and by Lem. 26, setting S = ρ0 − ρ1, σ = ρ,
|ρ0 − ρ1|tr ≤
1
2
√
Tr(ρ−1/2(ρ0 − ρ1)ρ−1/2(ρ0 − ρ1)). (8)
Combining Eq. (7) with Eq. (8) gives
| f (Z)ρZ −UρZ|tr ≤
√
1
4
|Pr[M(ρZ) = f (Z)]− Pr[M(ρZ) 6= f (Z)]|.
Finally,
|Pr[M(ρZ) = f (Z)]− Pr[M(ρZ) 6= f (Z)]| ≤ 2 | f (Z)M(ρZ)−UM(ρZ)|tr ≤ 2 | f (Z)E(ρZ)−UE(ρZ)|tr ,
as the left hand side describes a trivial strategy to guess f from M(ρ), giving the desired result.
Corollary 27. If E is a classical one-bit output (k1, k2, ε) two-source extractor, then it is a (k1 + log ε−1, k2 +
log ε−1,
√
3ε/2) two-source extractor against quantum knowledge.
Proof. By Lem. 25, |E(X, Y)ρXρY −UρXρY|tr ≤
√
1
2 |E(X, Y)E(ρXρY)−UE(ρXρY)|tr. A direct cal-
culation shows that for every x, y, E(ρx ⊗ ρy) = E1(ρx) ⊗ E2(ρy), where E1, E2 are Pretty Good Mea-
surements on states XρX , YρY respectively. In other words, E(ρX ⊗ ρY) induces a classical distribution
CX ⊗ CY. Thus
|E(X, Y)ρXρY −UρXρY|tr ≤
√
1
2
|E(X, Y)CXCY −UCXCY|tr, (9)
where Hg(X ← CX) ≥ Hg(X ← ρX), and the same for Y.
By the definition of (classical) guessing entropy, one can easily show that a classical (k1, k2, ε) two-
source extractor is a (k1 + log ε−1, k2 + log ε−1, 3ε) extractor against classical knowledge (for details see
Proposition 1 in [KT08]). Ineq. (9) then gives the desired parameters against quantum knowledge.
By a similar argument and following the proof of Theorem 1 in [KT08], we get
Corollary 28. If E is a classical one-bit output (k1, k2, ε) X-strong extractor, then it is a (k1, k2 + log ε−1,
√
ε)
X-strong extractor against quantum knowledge.
The multi-bit output case: We now show how to apply the results in the one-bit case, together with our
XOR-Lemma 10, to show security in the multi-bit case, proving Thm. 4.
By Ineq. (5) in the proof of Cor. 14, inner product is a classical X-strong extractor with error ε ≤
2−(k1+k2−n+2)/2. Plugging this into Cor. 28 we obtain
Corollary 29. The function EIPA(x, y) = Ax · y, for any full rank matrix A, is a (k1, k2, ε) X-strong
(Y-strong) extractor against quantum knowledge provided that k1 + k2 ≥ n− 2 + 6 log ε−1.
We now repeat the steps performed in Sec. 4 in the setting of non-entangled guessing entropy adversaries
to obtain a multi-bit extractor against quantum knowledge. In exactly the same fashion as in the proof of
Lem. 19 we use the XOR-Lemma 10 to reduce the security of ED to the strong one-bit case of Cor. 29.
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Lemma 30. ED is a (k1, k2, ε) X-strong (Y-strong) extractor against quantum knowledge provided that
k1 + k2 ≥ 6m + n− 2 + 6 log ε−1.
Proof. By the XOR-Lemma 10 and Cor. 29,
|E(X, Y)ρYX −UmρYX|tr ≤
√
2m ∑
S 6=0
∣∣(ASX ·Y)ρYX −U1ρYX∣∣2tr ≤ 2m · 2−(k1+k2−n+2)/6.
To obtain our final result, we now compose our strong extractor with a seeded extractor against quantum
knowledge.
Lemma 31. Let EB : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}d be a (k1, k2, ε) X-strong extractor against quantum
knowledge and let ES : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a (k1, ε) seeded extractor against quantum knowl-
edge14. Then E(x, y) = ES(x, EB(x, y)) is a (k1, k2, 2ε) extractor against quantum knowledge.
Proof. Immediate from the extractor definitions and the triangle inequality.
Corollary 32 ([DPVR09, Corrolary 5.3]). There exists an explicit (k, ε) seeded extractor against quantum
knowledge with seed length d = O(log3(n/ε)) and m = d + k− 8 log k− 8 log ε−1 −O(1).
Proof of Theorem 4: ED is an X-strong extractor against quantum knowledge with 16(k1 + k2 − n −
6 log ε−1) − O(1) output bits. This is larger than O(log3(n/ε)) when k1 + k2 > n + Ω(log3(n/ε)).
Composing with the seeded extractor of Cor. 32 on the source X gives m = 16(k1 + k2 − n− 6 log ε−1) +
k1 − 8 log k1 − 8 log ε−1 −O(1), and similarly for Y.
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A Many Bit Extractors Against Quantum Storage from Classical Storage
Ko¨nig and Terhal [KT08] prove that any (classical) seeded extractor is secure against non-entangled quan-
tum storage, albeit with exponentially larger (in the storage size) error. Their proof is also valid for X-strong
(Y-strong) two-source extractors.
Their Lemma 5 essentially shows that every (k1, k2, ε) X-strong extractor has error 4 · 23b2 · ε against
(b1, b2) quantum storage (for any b1), assuming H∞(X) ≥ k1 and Hg(Y ← ρY) ≥ k2 + log ε−1. Recall
that Hg(Y ← ρY) ≥ H∞(Y)− b2. Adapted to our definitions, their result is
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Lemma 33 ([KT08, Lemma 5]). Let E be a (k1, k2, ε) X-strong extractor. Then E is a (k1, k2 + b2 +
log ε−1, 4 · 23b2 ε) X-strong extractor against (b1, b2) non-entangled storage.
In particular, this shows that ED is an X-strong extractor with m = k1 + k2 − 10b2 − n− 4− 3 log ε−1.
For comparison, our Lem. 19 gives m = 12(k1 + k2 − b2 − n + 2− 2 log ε−1), which is better when the
storage is large, say, b2 ≥ k2/19.
For completeness, we derive an alternate version of Thm. 2 based on Lem. 33, by composing the extrac-
tor above with the seeded extractor of [DPVR09].
Theorem 34. The DEOR-construction is a (k1, k2, ε) extractor against (b1, b2) non-entangled storage with
m = (1− o(1))max(k1 − 9b2, k2 − 9b1) + k1 − b1 + k2 − b2 − n − 11 log ε−1 −O(1) output bits pro-
vided k1 + k2 − 10 max(b1, b2) > n + Ω(log3(n/ε)).
Here too we are able to extract more bits than guaranteed by Thm. 2 when the storage is symmetric and
constitutes a small fraction (< 1/19) of the min-entropy. In particular, the storage must be at least ten times
smaller than the min-entropy, whereas no such restriction exist in Thm. 2.
We note that it is not immediately possible to obtain an analogue of Lem. 33 for weak two-source
extractors. The proof relates the security of an extractor with respect to quantum side information, to its
security with respect to classical side information. In the weak extractor setting, it thus suffices to consider
classical side information of the form F(ρX ⊗ ρY) for some specific POVM F given in the proof. The
problem with this approach is that generally F(ρX ⊗ ρY) might induce a random variable CXY correlated
with both X and Y, breaking the independence assumption (i.e., when conditioning on values of CXY, X
and Y might not be independent) and rendering the classical extractor insecure. It is not inconceivable that
F does have the property F(ρX ⊗ ρY) = CX ⊗ CY, but we leave this open.
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